Hindustan Times 

Prof. Syed Munir Khasru
Hindustan Times
February 11, 2026

https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/people-at-the-heart-of-dhaka-delhi-ties-101770821076403.html
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The India-Bangladesh relationship is experienced before it is debated — in bus routes and border queues, in families crossing for treatment, and in markets stocked with goods that travel a few hundred kilometres rather than across oceans. It is rooted in shared history, language, and geography, and something rarer, fighting together for an outcome that reshaped the region. In 1971, India’s support for Bangladesh’s Liberation War became a foundational reference point in New Delhi’s neighbourhood diplomacy. That legacy matters, but it cannot manage today’s expectations.

More than five decades of Indo-Bangla relations show a recurring pattern. After Independence, early alignment with India was closely associated with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The rupture of 1975, following Mujib’s assassination, changed the rhythm of relations. Under Ziaur Rahman (mid-1970s to 1981), Bangladesh pursued a diversified foreign policy, seeking wider strategic space, not hostility toward India, but less of the post-1971 intimacy.

Then, under the military ruler, general Hussain Muhammad Ershad (1982–1990), an alumnus of India’s National Defence College, ties were steadied through pragmatic engagement. His ouster in 1990 ushered in parliamentary democracy in 1991, but politics thereafter in Bangladesh became dominated by intolerant rivalry and recurring disputes over electoral credibility. As successive governments recalibrated foreign policy, relations with India increasingly became entangled in domestic political contestation.

India often read the Sheikh Hasina-era as a predictable period of stability, particularly on security. However, many in Bangladesh felt that India’s comfort with one person and one party came at the expense of their country. After the upheaval of 2024, that narrative turned combustible, illustrating how ties anchored to a party rather than to the people can become vulnerable to regime change, street anger, and misinformation. When Dhaka’s politics become a zero-sum contest where “pro-India” and “anti-India” labels replace policy debate, bilateral relations tend to harden along partisan lines. Closeness to one regime is followed by strained ties under another.

Bangladesh will vote in a crucial election today. With the Awami League banned from contesting the elections, it is likely that either the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Tarique Rahman — the son of the recently deceased former PM, Khaleda Zia — or the Jamaat-e-Islami, led by Shafiqur Rahman, is likely to lead the next government in Dhaka. The former is a more liberal, progressive, and centrist party, while the latter leans more to the right, with a compass of “Islamic values” and a controversial history of opposing the War of Liberation in 1971.

A new government with a credible mandate, irrespective of identity and ideology, gives New Delhi a unique opportunity to reboot relations and start working towards a new era whereby relations are anchored in the people and policies as opposed to a person and one party.

Continuity in cooperation is a must to keep borders safe and secure. The Bay of Bengal and Northeast connectivity agendas should not become hostage to partisan swings. While a pragmatic, policy-focused nationalism can strengthen bargaining on both sides, both must refrain from grievance-based rhetoric that can turn diplomacy into permanent theatre.

While India has been emphasising “free, fair, inclusive and credible elections” in Bangladesh, many in Dhaka question New Delhi’s stance during elections of 2014, 2018 and 2024, which were widely criticised for being rigged, and were boycotted by the major Opposition parties. India’s framing of these polls and the attendant tensions as Bangladesh’s “internal” affair and endorsement of Sheikh Hasina’s unchallenged, undemocratic rule spanning more than one-and-a-half decades, have left a poor imprint on the minds of the Bangladeshis who were deprived of their democratic rights in the period. Addressing that perception does not require megaphone diplomacy but even-handedness.

Ties need to be rebuilt once elections are over. The stakes are visible in everyday economics: Bilateral trade was about $13.51 billion in FY24, with India exporting $11.3 billion to Bangladesh. That interdependence is reflected in the shared infrastructure — the rail links and passenger trains, bus services, inland waterways, and port arrangements that route cargo via Chittagong and Mongla, between India’s Northeast and the rest of its territory.

Energy is another backbone of India-Bangladesh ties, with the latter importing about 1,160 MW of electricity from India. Bilateral connectivity has also expanded with restored and newly launched cross-border rail services such as the Maitree, Bandhan, and Mitali Express trains, additional freight rail routes, and strengthened inland water transit and road links — developments that have deepened economic integration and strengthened people-to-people ties.

The same is true of the service sector, especially health care, which makes the relationship important for many Bangladeshi families. In 2024, around 482,000 Bangladeshis travelled to India for medical treatment, accounting for an estimated 50–60% of India’s medical tourism inflow. This is a win-win: Bangladeshi families get access to care and services, while India gains revenue and demand for its hospitals, hotels, and local businesses.

A sustainable reset is not about Bangladesh being “friendly” or India being “generous”. It is about insulating cooperation from partisan cycles and investing in the everyday networks of trade, transit, energy, and people that keep the relationship running. The election will decide who governs, but the harder test is what kind of relationship evolves in the morning after.

Neighbours sharing a 4,000-kilometre border cannot choose each other, they can only decide on the language of engagement. If New Delhi wants a partnership that does not sway with a change of government, it must invest where it lasts longest and put into practice what Indian officials have repeatedly underlined: “People are the main stakeholders” in India-Bangladesh ties.

Syed Munir Khasru
Hindustan Times
March 24, 2025

Link: https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/dhakas-tortuous-pursuit-of-constitutional-reforms-101742827263993.html
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There are fresh rumbles in Bangladesh’s political sphere — a student-led party that emerged from the revolution that ousted the Sheikh Hasina government has become a bold voice for democratic reform, although it is quite unruly yet. As calls for elections grow louder, the tension between this urgency and the reforms needed continues to define this critical moment. Not long ago, Muhammad Yunus, the head of the interim government, met with political parties to build consensus regarding reforms. So far, there is no concrete agreement among the political parties on the charter of reforms.

The proposed changes to the Constitution aim to replace the core principles of nationalism, socialism, democracy, and secularism with new ideals — equality, human dignity, social justice, pluralism, and democracy. While these changes aim to address the long-standing grievances of the public, they are not without challenges. As Bangladesh transitions from decades of centralised authoritarian rule, it now enters uncharted territory, where outcomes remain unpredictable yet highly consequential.

Many have argued that the existing Constitution has outlived its utility, becoming a tool for authoritarianism rather than a charter for democracy. The nine-member constitutional reform commission, chaired by Bangladeshi American political scientist and writer Ali Riaz, has proposed significant changes, including restructuring the foundational principles. These principles, particularly secularism, are misaligned with the country’s identity given 90% of the population is Muslim, maintains Bangladesh’s attorney general, Muhammad Asaduzzaman. Other proposed reforms include the establishment of a bicameral legislature to improve representation and balance of power, limiting the prime minister (PM)’s tenure to two terms, and bringing back public referendums to give citizens a direct say in constitutional changes.

The constitutional reform commission itself is not without controversies. When Riaz was appointed as its head, critics questioned why an academic, and a US citizen affiliated with an American think tank, was chosen for this role. Riaz’s lack of background in law also has led to concerns about his suitability for the job.

The existing 1972 Constitution embodies ideals of the liberation war, which many believe has been diluted and weaponised by successive governments over the years. Principles like nationalism have been used to suppress dissent, while secularism has coexisted uneasily with Islam as the State religion since 1988, in many instances alienating both the Muslim majority as well as the religious minorities. Article 70, which prevents members of parliament from voting against their party, has stifled legislative debate and concentrated power in the PM’s hands. This provision reflects deeper issues of disunity and lack of internal democracy within political parties. The absence of term limits has allowed for prolonged, unchecked rule, exemplified by Sheikh Hasina’s uninterrupted 16-year-long tenure in office.

The 1991 transition from a presidential to a parliamentary democracy aimed to prevent the over-centralisation of power. It failed to achieve its purpose due to the uncontested dominance of the PM’s office, which both Hasina and Khaleda Zia’s regimes have illustrated. The political ecosystem remains entrenched in dynastic rule, with power often restricted to members of prominent political families. This reflects failure of political parties to embrace internal democracy or foster diverse leadership. Without genuine intent, which has to come from within the parties, cosmetic changes will not resolve these obstinate issues.

While Hasina’s tenure is credited with economic achievements like infrastructure development, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, and poverty reduction, it was marred by increasingly authoritarian governance. Electoral processes were rendered farcical with the 2014, 2018, and 2024 elections characterised by Opposition boycotts, voter intimidation, and allegations of massive fraud. The abolition of caretaker government system in 2011 cemented Hasina’s grip on power, leaving the Opposition, particularly Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami, open to political persecution and marginalisation.

BNP and Jamaat have expressed willingness to cooperate in varying degrees on getting the reforms done. However, while BNP has been stressing the urgency of holding general elections, arguing that reforms and elections are complementary processes, Jamaat has been advocating for holding elections after reforms have been undertaken. Hence, the timeline for the next general election remains uncertain, despite Yunus signalling that they could be held by the end of this year or next year. Moreover, new political forces entering the picture, including the anti-discrimination student’s movement, has signalled a break from the Awami League-BNP duopoly.

Amid these shifts, the push to establish multiculturalism as a foundational principle has gained momentum. The BNP has embraced this direction through its Bangladeshi nationalism ideology, advocating for greater inclusivity. Likewise, the Jamaat has exhibited a more non-communal stance, by protecting temples and churches in vulnerable times. These developments do offer hope toward unity and a break from the divisive politics that characterised the past. However, challenges remain, particularly given Jamaat’s Islamist history, which raises questions about its commitment to pluralism and democracy.

Constitutional reforms have been proposed also to realign Bangladesh with aspirations of the 1971 liberation war as well as the mass uprising of 2024, emphasising justice, inclusivity, and democratic participation. However, the proposal to rewrite foundational principles has sparked unease. Proponents argue that the existing principles are outdated for today’s Bangladesh. They believe that prioritising pluralism over secularism should acknowledge the country’s multicultural identity, while shift from nationalism to social justice would focus on individual rights over State dominance. Yet, whether these reforms will realise the promise of justice and democracy or again fall prey to the centralised power cycle is a question only time can answer.

Syed Munir Khasru

Hindustan Time
August 01, 2024

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Bangladesh’s student-led protests began as peaceful demonstrations against a controversial quota system in government jobs but have since morphed into violent nationwide unrest. This exposes deep-seated tensions in Bangladeshi society and raises questions about the country’s governance. The 30% quota for descendants of freedom fighters in government jobs, part of a broader system established in the aftermath of the country’s independence in 1971, has long been a contentious issue. While intended to honour sacrifices made during the war of independence from Pakistan, it has increasingly been viewed by many as an anachronistic policy that undermines meritocracy and perpetuates inequality. The students’ demands were straightforward: Abolish this quota and give jobs on merit. They argued that the system failed to reflect the needs and aspirations of contemporary Bangladesh. Their cause quickly gained traction, resonating with a broader segment of society frustrated by limited economic opportunities and perceived governmental nepotism.

The government went in heavy-handed, deploying police and paramilitary forces. This disproportionate use of force only broadened anger against the administration. As the protests grew, so did the violence. Clashes erupted between demonstrators and pro-government supporters, particularly members of the ruling party’s student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra League. The resulting chaos has led to a shocking toll: Hundreds have died, with thousands more injured. Attacks on journalists have stoked fears about press freedom. The government’s decision to impose a communications blackout, blocking internet and social media access, has only exacerbated the situation. Ostensibly aimed at disrupting the organisation of protests, it has instead fuelled speculation about the true extent of the unrest and the government’s attempts to control the narrative.

In response, the Supreme Court ordered a reduction in the freedom fighters’ quota from 30% to 5%, with 93% of jobs to be allocated based on merit. While this decision has been cautiously welcomed by protest organisers, it has not been enough to quell the unrest.

The government attributes the unrest to opposition parties, particularly the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, claiming they are instigating violence under the cloak of the student movement. However, the student protesters assert their political neutrality, emphasising that their demands are centred on establishing a fair, merit-based system that benefits all citizens, rather than serving any political agenda.

The persistence of the protests, even after the concessions, points to deeper issues at play. The demonstrations have become a vehicle for expressing a range of grievances, from widespread corruption and economic inequality to concerns about democratic backsliding under an increasingly authoritarian rule. During 2014-2024, Bangladesh’s electoral landscape has been characterised by limited competition. The BNP and its allies, for most parts, abstained from participating in the elections, resulting in contests that lacked broad political representation. This crisis lays bare the complex challenges facing Bangladesh. A 15.75% unemployment rate among young people translates to about 21.48 lakh unemployed youths aged 15-29, representing 83% of the country’s total unemployed population, underscoring the need for youth-focused job creation and skill development initiatives. On one hand, the country’s GDP expanded at an impressive average rate of 6.4% per year from 2016-21, and poverty fell from 44.2% in 1991 to 13.8% in 2016-17. On the other, it grapples with high youth unemployment, political polarisation, and a struggle to balance its historical legacy with the demands of a rapidly modernising society. The quota system has become a flashpoint in this debate. Its reform highlights the need for Bangladesh to find new ways of honouring its past while fostering a more inclusive economic future.

As Bangladesh moves forward, several key issues demand attention. First, there is an urgent need for dialogue between the government and protesters to address not just the quota system but the underlying concerns fuelling the unrest. Second, the heavy-handed response to the protests calls for a re-evaluation of law enforcement tactics and a commitment to protecting citizens’ right to peaceful assembly. Third, the crisis underscores the need to create more opportunities for Bangladesh’s growing youth population. With a significant demographic dividend on the horizon, the country must focus on job creation, skills development, and rewarding merit and innovation.

How Bangladesh navigates this crisis will be crucial in determining its path forward as a democracy and an emerging economic power in South Asia. The challenge now is to channel the energy of these protests into constructive dialogue and meaningful reform, ensuring progress benefits all, not just a select few.

Syed Munir Khasru
Hindustan Times
July 3, 2024

Link: https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/bimstec-imperative-for-india-s-regional-ambitions-101720021234662.html
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The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) celebrated its 27th anniversary on June 6. As India’s role gains heightened significance amidst a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape, BIMSTEC emerges as a crucial platform that could unlock the country’s potential as a regional leader.

In its existence of over two decades, its significance has been overshadowed by other regional blocs, with the most prominent being the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has become moribund due to the souring of India-Pakistan ties. There has been a renewal of attention on the BIMSTEC in recent years as India seeks to strengthen its strategic partnerships and counterbalance the influence of other major regional powers, particularly China and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The BIMSTEC charter was signed and adopted during the 5th BIMSTEC Summit held in virtual format in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on March 30 this year, paving the way for partnerships and admission of new members and observers. Key areas of cooperation include economic development, trade, investment, technology transfer, connectivity, and people-to-people exchanges. One of the key advantages of BIMSTEC is its strategic location, spanning the Indian Ocean and the Southeast Asian regions. This positioning offers India a unique opportunity to bridge the gap between South Asia and Southeast Asia, fostering greater economic integration and enhancing regional connectivity.

India can play a pivotal role in shaping the region’s economic and infrastructural development agenda, which is crucial given the region’s infrastructure gap estimated at $1.7 trillion per year. aligns with India’s broader foreign policy objectives, including the Act East Policy, emphasising the importance of promoting a rules-based international order, strengthening regional cooperation, and ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific region. By actively engaging with BIMSTEC, India can fortify its position as a responsible regional power, committed to fostering peace, stability, and prosperity in its immediate neighbourhood.

One of the critical areas where BIMSTEC can yield tangible benefits is in the realm of trade and investment. BIMSTEC members collectively represent a market of over 1.8 billion people, approximately 22% of the global population, and a combined Gross Domestic Product estimated at $4.5 trillion. By enhancing economic cooperation and removing barriers to trade and investment, India can tap into this vast economic potential, creating new business opportunities and fostering inclusive growth across the region. Currently, intra-BIMSTEC trade accounts for only around 6% of the total trade among member countries, highlighting the untapped potential for deeper economic integration.

BIMSTEC provides a platform for addressing shared challenges, such as climate change, natural disasters, and transnational security threats. Collective action and cooperation in these areas can not only strengthen regional resilience but also reinforce India’s position as a responsible global stakeholder committed to sustainable development and regional stability. This is crucial given the region’s vulnerability to the climate crisis, with rising sea levels and extreme weather events posing significant risks to coastal communities and economies.

BIMSTEC’s member States collectively possess a diverse array of natural resources, skilled labour, and manufacturing capabilities that can be leveraged to create robust regional value chains. By fostering deeper economic integration, harmonising regulatory frameworks, and investing in regional infrastructure projects, India can tap into the complementary strengths of its neighbours to establish efficient and cost-effective supply chains. This could involve sourcing raw materials and intermediate goods from resource-rich countries like Myanmar, leveraging low-cost labour in nations like Nepal and Bhutan for labour-intensive manufacturing processes, and utilising India’s technological prowess and logistical capabilities to add value to global value chains. By fostering regional economic interdependence, India can gain a competitive edge in attracting foreign investment for the region, integrating into global production networks, and playing a pivotal node in the intricate web of global value chains.

There is a need for greater political will and commitment from all members. Historically, progress within BIMSTEC has been hampered by internal political dynamics, divergent priorities, and a lack of sustained engagement. India, as the largest economy and a major regional player, must lead in driving the organisation’s agenda and fostering a shared vision for regional integration. Secondly, BIMSTEC must prioritise tangible projects and initiatives that deliver measurable benefits. This could include enhancing physical connectivity by developing regional infrastructure projects like the BIMSTEC Transport Connectivity Master Plan, fostering greater people-to-people exchanges through initiatives like the BIMSTEC network of policy think tanks, and collaborating on tourism, agriculture, and renewable energy. Currently, only a handful of BIMSTEC projects, like the BIMSTEC Grid Interconnection and the BIMSTEC Motor Vehicle Agreement, have made notable progress. Thirdly, India must approach BIMSTEC as a complementary initiative to its other regional and global engagements, such as Quad, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), and the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI), and leverage BIMSTEC’s unique strengths and partnerships to further its broader strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific.

Success depends on astute diplomacy, tangible results, and solidifying India’s regional leadership. It is an opportunity to pursue mutually beneficial partnerships, sustainable development, and a prosperous Indo-Pacific vision. With an effectively functioning BIMSTEC, India can create an interconnected, secure neighbourhood while counterbalancing other major regional powers.

Prof. Syed Munir Khasru
Hindustan Times
Jan 03, 2024

Link: https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/elections-shine-a-spotlight-on-delhi-dhaka-ties-101704290286353.html
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As Bangladesh prepares for its 12th parliamentary polls on January 7, speculation abounds on the impact of the election outcome on Dhaka’s relationship with Delhi. From historic landmarks such as the 2015 land boundary agreement to lows during 2001-2006, when a coalition led by the current Opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), was in office, India-Bangladesh relations have gone through periodical ups and downs. Bangladesh emerged as India’s biggest trade partner in South Asia crossing $15 billion in 2022 and is a major recipient of Indian foreign direct investment, exceeding $3.5 billion in 2021. The strengthening of economic ties highlights pragmatic considerations that go beyond political rhetoric and challenge simplistic binaries.

Bangladesh Elections 2024: A supporter of Bangladesh Awami League party carries a giant portrait of Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina during an election rally in Dhaka, Bangladesh.(AP)PREMIUM
Bangladesh Elections 2024: A supporter of Bangladesh Awami League party carries a giant portrait of Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina during an election rally in Dhaka, Bangladesh.(AP)
The ruling Awami League (AL) in Bangladesh is historically perceived as closely aligned with India, while the BNP is thought to harbour anti-India sentiments. A deeper look reveals an intricate tapestry of cooperation and conflict underpinning the ties. The widely held belief that the AL and India share a deep ideological affinity, at times oversimplifies a relationship grounded in strategic realities and mutual interests.

Dhaka’s collaboration with Delhi in cracking down on insurgents operating from Bangladesh, for instance, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), is cited as evidence of the political alignment of AL with the Indian political establishment. However, the reality is more complex as the Sheikh Hasina government faced challenges from radical Islamist groups like Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB). It was a convergence of mutual interests, especially safeguarding the stability of both the border and internal security.

Landmark agreements, such as the 2015 land boundary agreement, are indicative of a relationship founded on pragmatism rather than ideological camaraderie. Similarly, the coastal shipping deal in 2015 opened new sea routes, boosting bilateral trade volumes, while the 2017 international rail links deal restored crucial railway links, improving overall connectivity and trade relations.

However, challenges persist. The Teesta water-sharing agreement remains unresolved, hindered by domestic opposition in West Bengal. The Tipaimukh Dam project raises Bangladesh’s concern about downstream impacts, with environmental assessments yet to allay fears. Border killings, allegedly due to the excessive use of force by security forces, continue to be a recurring issue. The AL’s alignment with India, oversimplified as a political and ideological embrace, is in reality rooted in a pragmatic understanding of shared strategic interests. The complexities of their collaboration, as evidenced by successes as well as ongoing challenges, underscore the need for a more balanced perspective on this crucial relationship in South Asia.

Apprehensions of an anti-India backlash in the event of a BNP coming to power — the BNP has now decided to boycott the elections — are based on historical precedents and nationalistic rhetoric. The BNP’s 2001-2006 term in office saw a rise in radical Islamist groups like Harkat-ul Jihad and JMB, fostering concerns over increased anti-India attacks and strained bilateral relations. However, a nuanced examination unveils complexities as the BNP is not a monolithic entity and has both moderate and hardline factions, with varying stances on India. This dynamic is underscored by events like the 2004 arms haul in Chittagong, revealing a massive cache of weapons that raised questions about illicit arms trafficking, further complicating ramifications for regional stability as then Assam chief minister Tarun Gogoi alleged that the arms consignment was meant for the separatist ULFA guerillas operating in the state.

During an interview in 2014, when asked what she would have done differently than Sheikh Hasina on relations with India, BNP leader Khaleda Zia said: “Unlike the Awami League government, I would have sought mutuality of gains in our bilateral relations in all areas… A future BNP government will encourage greater people-to-people contact... to diversify our relations and cooperation in all fields”.

Moving beyond a simplistic pro- and anti-India binary is imperative in understanding Bangladesh’s political landscape. The AL, despite fostering friendly ties with Delhi, has prioritised Bangladesh’s economic interests and welcomed infrastructure projects financed by China, India’s foremost regional rival. Similarly, the BNP’s strong rhetoric is sobered by pragmatic acknowledgement of economic interdependence. Recognising these complexities is essential for a better understanding of the dynamics that shape Bangladesh’s political leadership relations with India.

A foundation of clear-eyed, fact-based assessments of each other’s policies and actions is indispensable to improving Delhi-Dhaka relations. Communication channels engaging various political parties and stakeholders across borders can help dispel misgivings and misperceptions. Shared interests in regional trade, investment, connectivity, energy cooperation, climate resilience, maritime security, and economic integration should serve as the cornerstone of collaboration. This is an opportune moment for the leadership in both countries to reflect a vision that is progressive and mutually beneficial, recognising the nuanced interplay of economic, strategic, and demographic factors for both India and Bangladesh.

Syed Munir Khasru
Hindustan Times (India)
December 06, 2023

https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/a-delhi-dhaka-duet-for-the-present-and-future-101701868268530.html
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In late November, Bangladesh foreign secretary Masud Bin Momen met his Indian counterpart Vinay Kwatra in Delhi for this year’s second Foreign Office Consultations (FOC). Since this is likely the last high-level meeting before both countries head for elections, a sober reflection of the past 15 years of Indo-Bangladesh relations — since the Awami League came into power in Bangladesh — is timely.

Bangladesh holds a prominent position as India’s largest development and trading partner in South Asia, and India is Bangladesh’s second-largest trading partner globally. Both nations are acknowledged as engines of growth, drawing strength from four vital forms of capital: The abundant availability of cost-effective human capital, a deeply ingrained social capital rooted in shared values, rich biodiversity serving as natural capital, and substantial growth in physical infrastructure. This synergy positions them as key drivers of growth and development in the region. Prime Minister (PM) Sheikh Hasina’s leadership has instilled greater confidence in India to pursue a more robust neighbourhood policy. Dhaka is recognised by India as an important strategic partner in the region. The positive trajectory of Bangladesh’s economic growth underlines its significance in the region and reinforces the potential for collaborative initiatives between the two nations.

Indo-Bangla trade relations have grown manifold in recent times. During 2008-09, bilateral trade was around $2.8 billion, which reached $18.2 billion in 2021-22 This comprised $16.2 billion in Indian exports and $2 billion in imports. On October 1, India-Bangladesh engaged in discussions regarding the initiation of talks for a free-trade agreement to foster and strengthen economic ties between the nations. The proposed trade agreement is expected to boost exports from Bangladesh to India and help reduce the trade imbalance. India and Bangladesh agreeing to settle some international trade payments in Indian rupees will alleviate pressure on Dhaka’s dollar reserves.


This initiative promotes bilateral trade, starting with Indian rupees and later transitioning to Bangladeshi taka, reducing currency-related expenses for Bangladesh and capitalising on the stability and potential advantages of the rupee’s exchange rate dynamics.

Over the past 15 years, there has been a significant enhancement in connectivity, energy collaboration, and other areas. On November 1, PM Modi and PM Hasina, jointly inaugurated three India-supported development projects — the Akhaura-Agartala Cross-Border Rail Link, the Khulna-Mongla Port Rail Line, and Unit II of the Maitree Super Thermal Power Plant in Rampal, Bangladesh. In July 2010, India and Bangladesh also entered into a 35-year agreement for power transmission, allowing the transfer of 250 MW of electricity from India to Bangladesh.

In December 2019, Bangladesh agreed to purchase 718 MW of electricity from Reliance Power, spanning a period of the next 22 years. This year, Adani Power has commenced electricity export to Bangladesh from its 1,600 MW facility located in Godda, Jharkhand. Earlier this year, the India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline (IBFP) was inaugurated, which is a cross-border energy pipeline connecting India and Bangladesh, equipped to transport 1 million metric tons per annum (MMTPA) of high-speed diesel (HSD) to Bangladesh.

A key element shaping bilateral relations since PM Modi assumed office has been deepening India’s Northeastern region’s relations with Bangladesh. Dhaka has responded positively, resulting in various levels of sustained engagement on this front. Of the 4,096 km-long border with India, Bangladesh and Northeast India share 1,879 km, with a substantial portion being riverine. This provides water sharing opportunities, catering to both navigational and economic endeavours.

The widely discussed Teesta water sharing agreement remains unresolved. In 2011, the two countries came close to finalising a water sharing treaty whereby India was slated to receive 42.5% of the water and Bangladesh around 37.5% in the dry season. However, West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee vetoed the proposal as water supply remains within the jurisdiction of state governments in India, and the proposed treaty was not implemented.

Border killings on the India-Bangladesh border continue to be a contentious issue. The Bangladeshi human rights group Odhikar has alleged that the Indian border forces are responsible for the deaths of at least 334 Bangladeshis since 2011, along with numerous instances of severe abuse.

Under PM Hasina and PM Modi, the India-Bangladesh relationship has experienced a steady rise despite the failures in Teesta river water sharing, addressing trade imbalance and border fatalities. As elections approach, the challenge is to make continuity of progress independent of the political leadership that may emerge post-election.

In the fractured South Asian regional integration, the Indo-Bangla relationship is an exemplar of pragmatic political leadership and diplomatic sagacity. To have otherwise will not only be self-defeating but also a regression that neither country can afford.

Syed Munir Khasru
Hindustan Times
December 16, 2020

Link: https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/49-years-on-india-bangladesh-should-deal-with-unresolved-issues/story-U89UhWKCvatR08Og1YjvPP.html
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As Bangladesh marks its liberation war victory day on December 16, it is a good time to look at a crucial question that was both central to that era and is relevant even in the present day: where do Delhi-Dhaka ties stand now?

Vikram Doraiswami, the Indian high commissioner to Bangladesh, said in his first press briefing in Dhaka, “There is not, and will never be, a diminution of the highest level of importance that Bangladesh holds in India.” The leaders of the two nations, Prime Ministers (PMs) Narendra Modi and Sheikh Hasina, meet virtually on December 17, and it is clear that relations need a serious reboot.

On the economic front, Bangladesh is India’s largest trading partner in South Asia. Between 2009-10 and 2015-16, the trade deficit grew in India’s favour at a staggering 164.4%. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from India to Bangladesh is $3.11 billion, including Reliance’s $642-million 745 MW gas-fired project and Adani’s $400 million in Mirsarai Economic Zone. Despite India-Bangladesh relations being referred to as a “role model”, the irony is that in India’s Consolidated FDI policy 2017, Bangladesh is put in the same category as Pakistan. The FDI policy’s para 3.1.1 says, “A non-resident entity can invest in India…However, a citizen of Bangladesh/Pakistan or an entity incorporated in Bangladesh/Pakistan can invest only under the Government route.”

But there is good news too. Today, India and Bangladesh are better connected and goods are transported by road, rail and river routes using Bangladeshi vessels, trucks and railway. Recent agreements allow India to ship goods through Mongla port road, rail, and water routes.

The border remains sensitive. In spite of Section 11 (11) of the India-Bangladesh Coordinated Border Management Plan --- which says, “Neither side will resort to the use of lethal weapons except in self-defence against terrorists or smugglers” --- at least 25 Bangladeshi civilians were killed by the Border Security Force (BSF) in the first six months of this year. On the United States (US)-Mexico border, infamous for the narcotics trade, 111 were killed by the US border patrol force since 2010. In that period, 294 Bangladeshis were killed on the Indo-Bangla border.

Water remains another difficult issue. Bangladeshis have observed the tug-of-war on the Teesta water-sharing issue between the Centre and state. Indian PMs are sometimes accompanied by West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee during state visits to Dhaka; sometimes the CM has visited on her own. But all that has transpired are empty promises, as rivers run dry and farmers are cut off from their livelihood. However, during PM Sheikh Hasina’s India tour, an MoU was signed allowing India 1.82 cusecs of water from the Feni River.

India’s controversial Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) and National Register of Citizens (NRC) have created a negative impression in Bangladesh of India’s intent, which the Bangladesh Prime Minister termed “unnecessary”. Syed Muazzem Ali, the late Bangladesh high commissioner to India and recipient of the Padma Bhushan, once said, “Bangladeshis are not interested to migrate to India; they would rather go to Italy.” The CAA excludes Muslims from being granted citizenship as persecuted minorities, while the NRC in Assam excluded 1.9 million people, majority of them Muslims. The NRC and CAA can’t be brushed aside as “internal matters” when they have ramifications across the border.

The China factor also adds another dimension to the ties. Bangladesh is China’s second-largest arms export destination. Chinese firms have been outbidding their Indian counterparts in infrastructure projects. Bangladesh is deftly navigating relations with its two biggest neighbours in a neighbourhood in flux. Nepal is increasingly becoming closer to China; Bhutan has withdrawn from the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) initiative, Sri Lanka and the Maldives are playing a balancing act, both rooted in Chinese investments; Afghanistan is increasingly under the Taliban’s sphere of influence as the US withdraws troops. In a thaw in relations, Pakistan’s high commissioner to Bangladesh recently met the Bangladesh PM as both sides pledged to improve bilateral relations.

If Indo-Bangla relations are to move to “newer heights”, then unresolved issues have to be dealt with soon. Any dithering on this, with the region’s only trusted partner, may prove costly for India if it wants to avoid the kind of catch-up diplomacy it has been doing in the neighbourhood in the wake of the growing Chinese threat and Beijing’s widening influence in South Asia.

Hindustan Times
Syed Munir Khasru
April 9, 2015

Link: https://www.hindustantimes.com/comment/bangladesh-is-a-huge-opportunity-for-%20india/story-mEyAkDByw0knJPJqyCUyXL.html
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India-Bangladesh relations were discussed during last month’s meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee. The latter was reportedly supportive of the NDA government’s move to pass the India-Bangladesh Land Border Agreement (LBA) Bill. She was also positive on the Teesta water sharing pact. Modi is keen to settle both issues before he visits Bangladesh this year.

Sikkim, meanwhile, has placed its bets on building a slew of dams on the Teesta to generate 1,200 MW of hydropower. Water diversion at the Gazaldoba barrage remains a concern. Modi has been persuading Pawan Chamling, chief minister of Sikkim, where Teesta originates, to release more water to Bangladesh and West Bengal.

Bangladesh has pro-actively responded to India’s request for curbing cross-border violence. The Burdwan blast and the arrest of JMB terrorists in Assam highlight the importance of such cooperation. India’s recent proposal for a counter-terrorism pact builds on past achievements.

However, human rights groups in Bangladesh report that dozens of people have been gunned down by the BSF. A joint patrol along the international border will help to address this and combat smuggling.

The Confederation of Indian Industry has identified potential sectors for Indian investment in Bangladesh, including electrical machinery, agro processing, automobiles, textiles and organic chemicals. Despite such potential less than 3% of India’s total outward FDI flow was to Bangladesh in 2013.

Indian investment in Bangladesh during January-September 2014 was only $54 million — lagging behind eight countries, including Pakistan. India and Bangladesh need to exploit untapped potential by improving connectivity and removing trade barriers. The cross-border Akhaura-Agartala railway link, strengthening connectivity between India’s North-East and Bangladesh, can be a good start.

Given the congenial atmosphere prevailing in both New Delhi and Dhaka, it is time to transform Indian assurances into actions. Bangladesh also needs to actively facilitate increased Indian investment. Good economics leads to good politics and ultimately helps build strong ties between the neighbours.

Syed Munir Khasru
Hindustan Times
December 02, 2014
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The 2014 Saarc Summit, which started with high expectations, ended low on delivery. The rivalry between India and Pakistan continues to frustrate efforts to integrate South Asia. Prime Minister Narendra Modi remarked in his opening speech that “Himalaya today is calling us to act. Let us work to change cynicism into optimism.”

His Pakistan counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, stated: “We should build on convergences and minimise divergences.” In reality, when even a gesture as small as Modi shaking hands with Sharif becomes news, it exposes the kind of congeniality prevailing in Saarc. The face-saving energy cooperation deal, so essential for the electricity-starved region, came about only after behind-the-scenes jockeying to get Pakistan on board as the summit ended with little tangible progress.

The unfortunate reality is that, with abundant natural resources and more than 1.5 billion people, Saarc has the potential to become the world’s largest economy after the United States and China and is perceived as the next largest consumer market buoyed by steady economic growth and a booming middle class. For example, India’s middle class is expected to reach 550 million by 2025-26, more than the combined forecasted population of Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Spain of 330 million. Yet, Saarc is failing to harvest the benefit with intra-Saarc trade of only 5%, compared to Asean’s 32%, the EU’s 50% and NAFTA’s 65%.

While Saarc is high on rhetoric and low on performance, Asean has the momentum by becoming the centre of two emerging mega regional trade blocs — Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), championed by China, and Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), promoted by the US. The fact that India is the only Saarc country to be part of the RCEP and not the TPP, signifies how unimportant Saarc has become compared to Asean as far as global trade and investment are concerned.

Asean is a good example for Saarc, particularly for India and Pakistan, to realise the value of cooperation and benefits resulting from a larger common market despite diversity in politics and religion. In 1975, Asean nations signed the treaty of amity and cooperation, adopting the principles of renunciation of threat or use of force and settlement of disputes by peaceful means. The shared conviction of creating an economically win-win situation mobilised the nations in forming an interdependent regional economy.

The Asean Regional Forum was created in 1994 to foster dialogue, promote confidence-building, and adopt preventive diplomacy. A similar forum for Saarc will not only create room for deliberations but also bolster the fragile diplomatic relations.

To pave the way for Saarc’s integration India-Pakistan rivalry has to stop and this calls for bold leadership. Given that India occupies 70% of the Saarc region, both geographically and economically, India has the onus to bring Saarc nations together, as stated by Modi: “I know India has to lead, and we will do our part.” Whether he walks the talk remains to be seen.

For Saarc to progress, it must first capitalise on less contentious issues. Short-term success will create the momentum to work on long-term goals of regional connectivity, resource sharing, and investment. A good start can be adopting a ‘South Asia First’ policy, making Saarc countries import products first from within the region. For example, major garment-manufacturing countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka import more than 80% of raw materials from outside Saarc, even though India and Pakistan are net exporters in this sector.

Leaders will need Himalayan heights of vision and courage to make Saarc a success. Whether Modi and his South Asian colleagues will rise to the occasion to unleash a new era of regional cooperation or Saarc will continue to languish in the abyss of historical mistrust and myopic economic vision is something the 1.5 billion people of South Asia will have to wait and see, even 30 years after Saarc’s existence.